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a b s t r a c t
We study a situation in which an R&D department promotes the introduction of an
innovation that results in costly re-adjustments for production workers. In response, the
production department tries to resist change by improving the existing technology. Resis-
tance to change triggers competition between departments, which, in turn, spurs effort.
We show that firms balancing the strengths of the two departments perform better. As a
negative effect, resistance to change might distort the R&D department’s effort away from
radical innovations. The firm can solve this problem by implementing the so-called skunk
works model of innovation where the R&D department is isolated from the rest of the orga-
nization. Several implications for managing resistance to change and for the optimal design
of R&D activities are derived.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Innovation is one of the main drivers of a firm’s competitive advantage. Innovation may, however, challenge the status-
quo, and force change and adjustment within the organization (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson, 1993). Change is
costly, not only for the firm as a whole, but also for each of its individual members. For instance, Morrill (1991) identifies
several potential sources of costs: loss of power and prestige, need to retrain and relearn, changing definition of success, fear
of technology, etc. In an attempt to avoid these costs, the employees of the firm may sometimes react to change by fighting
it back rather than adapting to it.
In large corporations, this resistance to change can develop into potential conflicts between functions or departments,
insofar as an innovation championed by one function inflicts some costs upon another function. Interdepartmental conflicts
have been analyzed extensively in the new product development (NPD) literature (e.g., Luo et al., 2006). An established
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wisdom argues that conflicts are counter-productive because they disrupt teamwork and harmony within the organization
(Griffin and Hauser, 1996). However, a growing number of studies has shown that “a healthy dose of conflict also plays an
important role in fostering innovation” (Dyer and Song, 1998; Xie et al., 1998).While little systematic evidence exists for how
pervasive interdepartmental conflicts due to innovation and resistance to change are, the aforementioned debate within the
NPD literature suggests that the phenomenon is of practical relevance and worthy of deeper consideration (Birkinshaw and
Lingblad, 2005).
How should a firmmanage resistance to change and the resulting conflict between functions? To address this question,we
buildagame theoreticalmodelwhere the implementationof a successful innovation, backedbyanR&Ddepartment, results in
costly changes for a production department. In response, the production department tries to improve the current technology
in an attempt to convince the management not to implement the innovation. The two departments are, in other words,
involved in a contest of technologies.1 As an example of the type of situation we have in mind, Foster (1986) describes the
case of DuPont and its decision in the 1950s to move from the established nylon technology to the new polyester technology
for the production of car tires. Behind the decision there was a conflict between production engineers at the nylon plant and
researchers supporting the new technology. The production engineers managed to push the nylon technology to the limits,
and provided sufficient evidence to convince the management that the nylon technology would remain competitive. The
polyester technology was eventually shelved.
We show that organizations with greater resistance to change, i.e. firms whose production departments face larger costs
of re-adjustment, exhibit a lower probability of introducing a new technology. However, this is not always profit reducing
for the firm as a whole. Indeed, it is shown that firms with highly motivated and productive R&D departments might benefit
from a stronger resistance to change. By contrast, firms whose R&D departments are weak or badly motivated suffer from
stronger resistance to change. More in general, our findings suggest that firms that maintain a balance of powers between
the two departments outperform firms where one department largely dominates the other.2
Although our analysis stresses the positive effects of internal competition, we argue in the second part of the paper that
(the threat of) internal competition might entail important costs for the firm. In particular, the prospect of a costly contest
of technologies might push the R&D department towards low risk, incremental projects that entail low adaptation costs for
the production department. Such incremental innovations meet much less internal resistance than radical innovations that
require the production department to undertake more costly changes. Thus, the R&D department refrains from investigating
more path-breaking research trajectories at the detriment of long-run firm profits.
We analyze an organizational solution to this problem, known as the skunk works model of innovation, which consists in
isolating the team of researchers from the influence of the rest of the organization.3 The skunk works model of innovation
has received lots of attention from management scholars and has been implemented by many large technology firms, such
as IBM, Siemens and Intel, but we are not aware of any formal economic model that attempts to pin down the virtues of this
organizational solution. We show that adopting the skunk works model of innovation can induce the R&D department to
choose a radical research trajectory in situations where an integrated R&D department would have chosen an incremental
trajectory to avoid the competition with the production department.
This paper is related to several bodies of literature both in economics andmanagement. Resistance to change is a source of
inertia inourmodelbothbecause it reduces theprobability thatnewtechnologies are implementedandbecause it distorts the
search process of the R&D department towards an incremental research trajectory. Scholars in evolutionary economics have
investigated extensively the sources of inertiawithin organizations.Nelson andWinter (1982) andDosi (1982), amongothers,
have stressed how scientists and engineers tend to myopically focus on existing technological trajectories and paradigms,
overlooking opportunities lying outside their search range. While the latter is undoubtedly an important motivation behind
organizational inertia, our model provides a complementary explanation based on interdepartmental conflict as discussed
above.
The adoption of a new technology is a decision that has important redistribution effects within the organization. The
economics literature has argued that such decisions are subject to influence activities by the involved parties, i.e. efforts
aimed at affecting the decision maker (Meyer et al., 1992; Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988). Such efforts distort
resources frommoreproductiveuses, slowdownthedecisionmakingprocess, andsometimespreventorganizational changes
altogether (Schaefer, 1998). Our approach can be thought of as representing a different time horizon. Shortly before the
management decideswhich technology to use, the performances of the technologies aremore or less given. The departments
will therefore spend resources trying to promote their preferred technology by presenting it well, buttering up decision
makers, etc. This is the situation captured by influence activitymodels. By contrast, we argue that there is an incentive earlier
1 Contests are situations in which the participants expend money or effort to increase their chances of winning a prize. Examples include rent-seeking
and lobbying situations, tournaments, arms races, political campaigns, athletic contests, patent races and procurement of innovations (Taylor, 1997; Che
and Gale, 2003; Ganuza and Hauk, 2006).
2 Evidence consistent with the notion that this type of organizational competition spurs innovation can be found in Ginn and Rubenstein (1986). They
study 61 new product introductions in a major chemical company. They show that product introductions leading to more intense competition, measured
by how incompatible the R&D department’s and the production department’s goals are, tend to be more successful than product introductions causing less
competition.
3 A windowless facility built by Lockheed at the airport of Burbank, California, during the Cold War was known as the skunk works. There, secret military
projects were developed. The term is borrowed from Al Capp’s comic strip Li’l Abner, which was popular in the 1940s.
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in the game to improve the technologies to have as strong a case as possible should the competition between departments
take place. We focus here on this long-run effect, but this is, of course, not to say that influence activities do not exist or are
irrelevant.
Organizational scholars have widely investigated the tension between the exploration of new alternatives and the
exploitation of current capabilities (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991) by employing simulation models based on
routine adaptation and learning (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). Exploitation refers to achieving maximal profits in the current
situation whereas exploration refers to the process of searching for new opportunities. In our model, the production depart-
ment is involved in exploitative activities, while the R&D department explores new technological possibilities. Although we
leave many of the subtleties in the background, we provide a different, incentive-based view of such a tension. Similarly to
this literature, we show that firms are well-advised in trying to balance explorative and exploitative activities. However, we
also find that exploitation might, under certain conditions, increase exploration by exposing the R&D department to tougher
internal competition.
Besides the already mentioned works, our analysis is related to two papers by Rotemberg and Saloner. In Rotemberg
and Saloner (1995), using a quite different model, the authors study the conflict between the sales and the production
departments, with the former wanting a broad product line and the latter wanting long production lines. The firm can
potentially benefit from the conflict, because the two departments present valuable information concerning costs to defend
their respective positions. Nevertheless, as their emphasis is on cost revelation, they do not study questions related to
innovation policies, which is our main interest here. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) analyze competition between two R&D
teams inside a firm. Again, the focus of their paper is quite different from ours. Rotemberg and Saloner study how hiring a
biased (visionary) CEO can induce higher efforts by the teams, but they do not look at issues such as, e.g., the skunk works
model of innovation and the tension between exploitation and exploration, which constitute the main contribution of our
work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the basic model that is then solved and discussed
in Section 3. In the basic model the possibility of using contracts to induce effort from the departments is assumed away.
It illustrates, however, the driving forces behind our findings and provides interesting insights on how interdepartmental
conflictswithin an organization should bemanaged. Section 4 extends the basic framework by allowing the R&Ddepartment
to choose the type of innovation to pursue (incremental vs. radical). It addresses the following question: what can the
management do if the conflict between departments is so tough that the R&D department shies away from a radical research
trajectory? The solution proposed is the skunk works model of innovation, which is shown to solve this problem provided
that researchers have sufficient intrinsic motivation to work on a radical research trajectory. In Section 5 we analyze and
discussalternative contractual assumptions, andshowthatourfindings remainqualitativelyunchangedas longas contractual
possibilities are incomplete. Section 6 summarizes our results and discusses managerial implications. Appendix A contains
formal proofs and technical material.
2. The basic model
Our firm is composed by three risk-neutral agents: a production unit (PU), a research unit (RU) and a management
unit (MU), which we describe in more detail below. Our framework captures better the reality of large firms where a clear
distinction between the RU and the PU exists.4 The firm is actually employing a standard technology to produce a given
product, which results in a profit of 1 = 0 if no further improvements are made.
2.1. The research unit
The RU expends unobservable creative effort, eR, that probabilistically generates a “new technology”, which could either
be a new product or a new process. The creative effort results in a new technology of value R with probability p where
R =eR, and  >0. With the complementary probability, 1−p, the effort is fruitless. The cost of effort is c(eR) = eR. The RU
receives a reward B if the new technology is adopted and 0 if it is not. Here, B can contain both monetary (paid by the firm)
and non-monetary elements such as peer-recognition, career concerns or personal satisfaction. We will discuss both these
possibilities below. The RU is wealth and credit constrained, and a possible monetary bonus must therefore be non-negative.
The RU can ensure itself a non-negative payoff by choosing eR =0, which is greater than its outside option. The RU maximizes
its utility, which is given by the difference between the expected reward and the cost of creative effort.
2.2. The production unit
The PU expends two types of effort: production effort and unobservable defensive effort. The production effort is indis-
pensable for running the technology. The PU receives a payoff normalized to zero as compensation for the production effort.
The defensive effort, eP, enhances the performance of the existing technology. We have in mind changes in the layout of
4 As we explain later, it is straightforward to extent the model to include some degree of overlapping between departments.
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production facilities, re-engineering of processes, cost reductions obtained through marginal innovations, elimination of
inefficiencies, changes in the design of the products which bring about cost savings or quality improvements, and so on. The
defensive effort increases the payoff of the existing technology by P = eP. The total value of the existing technology is there-
fore P. Such effort does not come for free, and the PU incurs a cost of c(eP) = eP. We call the effort defensive, because the PU
expends it only when threatened by a new technology. The reason is that the PU has made technology-specific investments
in the existing technology such as mastering it, learning how to deal with break downs, establishing routines and rules, etc.
A change of technology forces the PU to reinvest in order to be able to produce. The firm can partially compensate such
costs through training programs, monetary incentives and other policies. However, totally offsetting the inconveniencies of
change might be hard.5 In particular, we assume that the introduction of a new technology imposes a cost of F on the PU.
Faced with the potential threat of a new technology developed by the RU, the PU is thus willing to exert effort to improve
the existing technology, thereby reducing the likelihood that the new technology is adopted. Put differently, the PU tries to
resist change. As an alternative to resisting change, the PU can leave the firm. We assume that this option bears a cost of K>0.
K can be interpreted as relocation costs, search costs, reputation concerns, risk of being unemployed or simply quasi-rents
that are lost if the PU moves to another firm. We start by considering non-monetary incentives only (Section 3) but introduce
monetary incentives later on (Section 5). All wages to the PU must be non-negative due to wealth and credit constraints.
The PU maximizes its expected utility, which is equivalent to maximizing the total reward if the current technology is kept,
i.e. the avoided cost of change plus a possible monetary bonus, minus the cost of the defensive effort (provided that this is a
better option than leaving the firm).
2.3. The management unit
The last building block of our firm is the MU whose aim is to maximize firm profits. We assume that the firm is able to
implement at most one technology, either the existing technology or the new one. There are several reasons why this might
be the case. First, the two technologies might produce exactly the same product. Using both would therefore lead to ineffi-
cient duplication of costs. Second, the two technologies might depend on different organizational routines, and nurturing
both of themwould generate incompatibilities. Finally, the technologiesmight compete for the use of scarce, complementary
resources such as managerial talents, dedicated sales forces, financial resources, etc. Hence, after observing the technologies
proposed by the two departments, the MU decides either to continue with the existing (improved) technology or to imple-
ment the new technology, in which case the PU has to adapt to the new course of actions. Another important choice of the
MU concerns the contracts offered to the two departments. The profits of the firm consist of the payoffs from the technology
chosen minus all potential payments as compensation or monetary rewards.
2.4. Timing
If feasible, the MU chooses the reward structure. Then, the RU expends creative effort to generate a new technology.
Simultaneously, the PU expends defensive effort to improve the performance of the existing technology. After uncertainty is
resolved, the MU takes a decision about which technology to use. At the end of the game, payoffs are realized.
3. Solution of the basic model
To grasp the intuition and understand the key properties of our framework, we solve the model in its simplest version.
The robustness of the key properties is discussed later on. We assume here that the MU cannot use monetary instruments
to reward the departments. Then, the reward to the PU for maintaining the current technology is the adjustment cost, F,
that it would have had to bear if the new technology had been introduced. The reward, B, to the RU captures non-monetary
benefits from having its innovation implemented. What we have in mind here are benefits such as personal satisfaction,
career concerns, internal recognition and status that motivate the RU but do not represent an expense for the firm.6 We will
also assume that K≥pF, which implies that the PU will never use the option to leave the firm.
We solve the game starting from the last stage inwhich theMUmakes a decision about the technologies. Suppose that the
RU has developed a new technology. The MU will reject the technology proposed by the RU if P = eP >eR =R, whereas it
will abandon the existing technology if P <R. This selection rule for the technology is extremely simple and only requires
theMU tomake ordinal comparisons among alternatives.7 Both the RU and the PU exert efforts in order to influence theMU’s
decision in their respective interest. This competition between departments can be conceived as a contest with exogenously
given different prizes for the contestants. As tie-breaking rule, we assume that if P =R the MU chooses the technology
of the dominant department, i.e. the department with the highest willingness to invest in the contest. This assumption
5 As we discussed in the introduction, the cost of change for the PU should be interpreted broadly to include also psychological factors.
6 Stern (2004) shows that scientists are willing to give up some monetary rewards in exchange for the possibility to work on their preferred research
agenda.
7 In addition, different selection rules based on cardinal comparisons among alternatives suffer from commitment problems since, although possibly
profit enhancing ex ante, they imply inefficient decisions ex post.
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is commonly made in the contest literature (see, for instance, Che and Gale, 2003, p. 653). It is of a similar nature to the
assumption that guarantees the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in a gameof Bertrand competitionwith homogenous
products and asymmetric costs.
We distinguish two cases: F>B and F<B. In the first case the PU would win if both departments invested the full
value of their prize into the contest. We will say that the PU “dominates” in this case. It corresponds, e.g., to the situation
where inertial forces inside the firm are very strong and production workers and engineers are very adverse to change (F
large), i.e. there is a strong resistance to change. The researchers are not or cannot be strongly motivated (B low), or their
creative effort maps very poorly into valuable technology ( low). In the second case the RU dominates, i.e. it would win if
both departments invested the full value of their prize into the contest. This corresponds to a firm with very flexible human
capital in its production department that does not fear change (F low). It is also a firm with highly motivated and capable
researchers (B high and  low).
Before finding the equilibrium of the contest, we establish the following result.
Lemma 1. There is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Intuitive proof. Since the new technology only materializes with probability p, the maximum amount of effort that the PU
and the RU are willing to exert are pF and pB, respectively. Consider the case in which F>B. The other case is symmetric.
For any pB/2F, the PU is willing to make a defensive effort such that the MU’s decision is tilted in its favor. If it chooses such
an effort, the best response of the RU is to exert no creative effort. However, the best response to p(1− F/2B) is F given the
tie-breaking rule assumed. This is still not an equilibrium because the RU can do better by exerting a creative effort just large
enough to win the contest. As this circular argument suggests, no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. 
Lemma 1 is a standard result in the contest literature (Taylor, 1997; Che and Gale, 2003). A potential avenue to rescue a
pure strategy equilibrium is to make the relationship between the efforts of the contestants and the value of their technology
less deterministic.8 For instance, one could assume that ˛ and P are stochastic variables whose distributions depend on eR
and eP, respectively, and that the effort cost functions are convex. Although this formulation would deliver a pure strategy
equilibrium, it turns out to be much harder to handle analytically. Thus, the literature on contests has broadly resorted to
mixed strategy equilibria that are much easier to solve in explicit form (Che and Gale, 2003; Burguet and Che, 2004; Konrad,
2006). Since the solution allows a very intuitive interpretation as well, we have chosen to follow in this tradition.
Lemma 2 states the mixed strategy equilibrium for the case where the RU dominates the contest, F<B. In the proof in
Appendix A we derive the equilibrium in some detail to illustrate how it is constructed. Hillman and Riley (1989) show that
the equilibrium reported here is in fact the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 2 (F <B: the RU dominates). In equilibrium the PU randomizes according to the distribution function
G(eP)=1− (F/B) + (eP/pB) for all eP ∈ [0,pF] and the RU randomizes according to the distribution function H(eR) =eR/pF
for all eR ∈ [0,(pF/)]. The expected payoffs for the PU, the RU and the firm are respectively: UP =−pF, UR =p(B− (F/)), and
˘ = (pF/B)(F(3−2p) + 3pB/6).
The next lemma summarizes the equilibrium outcome for the case where the PU dominates, F>B. The equilibria of all
the contests we present in the rest of paper are derived using the method illustrated in the proof of Lemma 2. For this reason,
we present the equilibrium strategies, often in Appendix A, but leave out the algebra. Details are available from the authors
upon request.
Lemma 3 (F>B: the PU dominates). In equilibrium the PU randomizes according to G(eP)= (eP/pB) for all eP ∈ [0,pB] and
the RU randomizes according to H(eR) = 1− (B/F) + (eR/pF) for all eR ∈ [0,pB]. The expected payoffs for the PU, the RU, and the
firm are respectively: UP =−pB, UR =0, and ˘ = (B/F)(P(3F+pB/6).
The following remarks describe and compare the equilibrium outcomes for different values of the exogenous parameters.
Remark 1 (Expected efforts). The expected creative effort is B2p/2F if F>B and Fp/2 if F<B, whereas the expected
defensive effort is Bp/2 if F>B and F2p/2B if F<B.
Remark 2 (Comparative statics). When the RU dominates, the expected creative effort is increasing in F and decreasing in
 , whereas the expected defensive effort is increasing in F and decreasing in  and B. Expected profits are increasing in F
and decreasing in  and B. When the PU dominates, the expected creative effort is increasing in B and  and decreasing in
F, whereas the expected defensive effort is increasing in B and  . Expected profits are increasing in B and  and decreasing
in F. Finally, expected efforts as well as expected profits are always increasing in the probability that the new technology is
developed, p.
To interpret these comparative static results one should bear in mind that the efforts exerted by the two departments
are aimed at influencing the MU’s decision between the existing and the new technology. First, it is obvious that the efforts
8 Another alternative is to use a contest function to determine the winner. Here, the probability to win the prize increases with a contestant’s effort
and decreases with the rival’s effort in a continuous manner. We have preferred not to resort to such a function because it leaves unspecified the decision
process, which plays an important role in our story, and it requires further assumptions on how efforts map into profits.
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of the PU and the RU are (weakly) increasing in their respective rewards, F and B. Second, it is interesting to notice that a
larger F does not necessarily mean less profits, as one might have expected given that F parameterizes resistance to change.9
In fact, when the RU dominates, a larger F implies that both departments exert more effort and hence profits are higher.10
More in general, these comparative statics suggest that the firm always prefers to maintain a balance of powers between
the RU and the PU. The intensity of competition between the departments is (inversely) measured by the difference in their
strengths, |F−B|, and it is maximized when the departments are equally strong, F=B. These arguments are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Principle of balanced competition). The firm benefits if the relative strength of the two departments is balanced.
The principle of balanced competition is perhaps best understood using an analogy to a track race. A weak runner will not
spend a lot of energy racing against a much faster competitor as the chance of winning the race is low. The slow pace of the
weak runner, in turn, slows down the strong runner. After all, there is no reason to waste energy by running fast when this is
not needed to win the race. In order to make runners perform their best, they should thus be matched against a competitor
of equal strength. This is the same basic idea underlying the result of Proposition 1.
Some issues related to this principle deserve discussion. First, we study competition in technologies, but Proposition
1 applies more broadly to competitions inside the firm. Inderst and Laux (2005), e.g., analyze how competition for scarce
internal funds can stimulate innovation. They find, in line with Proposition 1, that the positive effect of competition on
innovation is strongest when the departments are equally strong.
Second, the intensity of interdepartmental competition is a source of heterogeneity across firms. Firmswithmore intense,
balanced competition perform better in our model. This finding is consistent with some of the empirical findings in the NPD
literature, which have shown a positive relationship between conflicts and innovation performance (Ginn and Rubenstein,
1986; Dyer and Song, 1998; Xie et al., 1998).
Third, as explained in Section 2, we have, for pedagogical reasons, kept the interests of our two departments fully orthog-
onal. However, it is likely that there exists a certain degree of overlap between production and R&D. This might occur both
because in smaller companies the separation between departments tends to be blurred and because the management tries
to stimulate collaboration and interaction between functions. One way to capture such an overlap is by assuming that each
department shares part of the reward, or loss, of the other department. To model this notion, suppose that each department
puts weight 1−ϕ on its own payoff and weight ϕ on the payoff of the other department, 0≤ϕ≤1/2. The model can be ana-
lyzed as above by simply replacing the reward to the PU and the RU by F˜ = (1 − ϕ)F − ϕB and B˜ = (1 − ϕ)B − ϕF , respectively.
Formulated in this way, an increased overlap (greater value of ϕ) reduces the stakes of two departments; an effect pushing
towards lower efforts and profits. At the same time, the degree of overlap affects the relative strength of the twodepartments.
If the PU dominates, an increased overlap weakens the RU even further. Therefore, applying the logic of Proposition 1, an
increased overlap results (unambiguously) in lower efforts and profits. However, if the RU dominates, an increased overlap
tends to equalize the strength of the departments. As balance spurs efforts, the total effect of increased overlap on profits is
a priori unclear and depends on the specific values of the parameters.
Finally, competition between departments might entail several negative effects that we do not account for in our frame-
work. For example, the development of a new technology might require a strict collaboration between production and R&D
where both departments benefit from reciprocal feedback. Strong competition might hamper such collaboration. Leveraging
resistance to change might therefore require firms to develop conflict management strategies or conflict-handling mecha-
nisms (e.g., Dyer and Song, 1998; Xie et al., 1998), which can be time and energy consuming. Strong internal competition
might also generate unproductive influence activities (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988) that might call for bureaucratic rules
limiting managerial discretion (Milgrom, 1988). Following the general idea that internal competition can have undesirable
side effects, which require an organizational response, Section 4 analyzes a situation inwhich too tough internal competition
leads to a distortion in the RU’s choice of the research trajectory. We study then how this problem can be ameliorated with
an appropriate organizational design.
3.1. Exploitation versus exploration
The principle of balanced competition is reminiscent of the suggestion by organizational theorists that the firm should
pursue a balance between the exploration of new alternatives and the exploitation of current capabilities (Levinthal and
March, 1993; March, 1991; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). As Levinthal and March (1993) put it, “. . .the basic problem con-
fronting an organization is to engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure its current viability and, at the same time, to devote
enough energy to exploration to ensure its future viability”.
However, exploitation and exploration are in constant tension. In fact, adaptation to existing environmental demandsmay
foster structural inertia and reduce a firm’s capacity to adapt to future environmental changes and new opportunities. In
otherwords, a firm that invests in augmenting its current capabilities andmaintaining its current focusmight perform rather
9 By the same argument, having a more motivated R&D department might not always be profit enhancing.
10 The probability of the RU winning the contest is pB/2F when PU dominates and p(1− F/(2B)) otherwise. Thus, the expected probability of observing
a change in the technology is still decreasing in F.
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poorly in generating ideas that are outside its core capabilities. Our framework can also handle this possibility, and provide
a different, incentive-based explanation of the well-researched tension between exploitative and explorative activities.
Assume that there is a previous period (t=0) before the very same game described above (t=1). In period 0 the firm uses
the standard technology. This activity generates profits 0(˛) where ˛ measures the degree of exploitation. By exploiting
the current technology, the MU takes actions that make the production and distribution more efficient, eliminate slacks,
routinize activities, and enhance specialization and expertise. Hence, we assume that ∂0(˛)/∂˛>0. The cost of pushing up
the exploitation of the standard technology in period 0 is C(˛). Here, C(˛) is assumed to be sufficiently convex to ensure that
the firm’s problem is concave in ˛.11
In period 1 the PU can improve the standard technology as before. Thus, the improvements are on top of 0(˛). The more
the firm invests in the standard technology in period 0 the stronger the PU is in period 1. For simplicity, we assume that p=1.
Also, let B−0(˛) > 0 in the relevant range, otherwise the best strategy for the RU is always to exert zero creative effort.
The following lemma reports the expected period 1 profits as a function of ˛ and 0(˛).
Lemma 4. If the PU dominates (F+0(˛) >B), then
1(˛) =
(B − 0(˛))(B(3F + B) + (3F − 2B)0(˛) + 0(˛)2)
6BF
and ∂1(˛)/∂˛<0. If instead the RU dominates (F +0(˛)<B), then
1(˛) =
F2 + 3BF − 3F0(˛) + 12B0(˛)
6B
,
and ∂1(˛)/∂˛>0.
We now turn to the firm’s optimal choice of ˛ in period 0.
Proposition 2. Let a myopic firm be a firm that maximizes profits period by period. If a myopic firm in period 0 chooses a level of
˛ such that the PU dominates in period 1, then a fully rational, forward-looking firm invests less in the standard technology than a
myopic one. However, if a myopic firm in period 0 chooses a level of ˛ such that the RU dominates in period 1, then a fully rational,
forward-looking firm invests more in the standard technology than a myopic one.
Greater investment in exploiting the standard technology makes the PU stronger. Indeed, it becomes more costly for the
RU to produce enough creative effort to change the status-quo. Put differently, greater exploitation tilts the contest between
the RU and the PU in favor of the latter. As long as the PU is already strong and has an advantage in the contest, exploitation
makes the competition between the two departments even more unbalanced, so it erodes incentives to exert efforts and
reduces profits in period 1. For this reason, a forward-looking firmwould invest less in the standard technology than amyopic
firm that only considers period 0 profits when choosing the optimal degree of exploitation. This corresponds well to the
notion that exploiting the current technology may hinder the exploration of future opportunities. More broadly, this finding
suggests that large established firms, with sunk investments in the current technology and rather inflexible organizations
geared at capturing the benefits of economies of scale, find it difficult to explore new opportunities and reinvent themselves.
Nevertheless, our model suggests that this is only a part of the story. When the RU is the strongest department, for instance
because the firm is operating in a fast developing technological area, further exploitation helps making the competition
between the two departments tougher and increases both explorative activities and expected profits.
4. The skunk works model of innovation
The outcome of the innovation process depends not only on the intensity of the creative effort, but also on the locus of
search. Often researchers have the freedom to choose among an array of research trajectories that encompass different levels
of uncertainty, different types of potential innovations, different knowledge bases, different technological competences,
among other features. Most importantly from our perspective, while some of these research trajectories, if successful, might
lead to important adaptation costs for the PU (large F), others might instead come at small or no adaptation costs (F∼=0).
Indeed, some research trajectories aremore probable to deliver radical innovations,while other trajectories aremore likely to
lead to incremental innovations.Radical innovationsarebasedonanewsetof routinesandexpertise. Incremental innovations
are based on existing routines and expertise (Henderson, 1993).12
Not surprisingly, a research trajectory which might lead to radical innovations (henceforth, a radical trajectory) is likely
to meet stronger resistance from the PU (Ginn and Rubenstein, 1986). Indeed, Gilbert (2006) argues that the organizational
rigidity increases in the level of threat perceived by the organization. To avoid a costly internal contest, the RU might thus
turn to a research trajectory that produces incremental innovations (henceforth, an incremental trajectory). Hence, although
11 In industries where learning-by-doing is important ˛ could be thought of representing the period 0 quantity produced. Higher production in period 0
reduces production costs in period 1 and makes the current technology more profitable.
12 In the organization literature these two kinds of innovations are often referred to as competence destroying and competence enhancing innovations
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986).
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the competition between the PU and the RU acts as an incentive mechanism, it might also produce a distortion towards less
profitable, incremental trajectories.
To stimulate radical innovations, researchers are often isolated from the influence of the rest of the organization. This
has become known as the skunk works model of innovation. The skunk works model was, e.g., the organizational design
followed by IBM to nurture the by then revolutionary PC (Roberts, 2004), by Ericsson Mobile Communications to develop
the Bluetooth technology (Nobelius, 2000), and it is employed by many large innovative firms, such as Intel, HP and Apple,
to develop potential breakthroughs.
The skunk works model is claimed to bring several advantages. Echoing the discussion on myopia in organizational
learning (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993), it gives researchers the necessary autonomy, independence and freedom
to escape the established lines of thought and to produce novel ideas; see, also, Christensen (1997). Closer to the argument
of this paper, it can also help to overcome the resistance that radical innovations meet inside the organization.13 In the
following, we explore the latter advantage using an extension of the basic model developed in Sections 2 and 3.
4.1. Setup and assumptions
Let us assume that there are two possible research trajectories, an incremental trajectory and a radical trajectory. The RU
chooses the research trajectory before the game analyzed in Section 3 starts.
Assumption 1. The characteristics of the two trajectories are:
Incremental trajectory:
FI = 0, pI = 1, I = 1, BI = B > 0
Radical trajectory:
FR > FI, pR = p < 1, R =  > 1, BR = B with  > 1.
Assumption 2. The RU dominates when the incremental trajectory is chosen, i.e. B> FI.
Assumption 1makes operational the idea of different research trajectories. The incremental trajectory leads to innovation
with certainty. The innovation builds on the current competences and expertise, so it results in smaller adaptation costs for
the PU. Nevertheless, for the RU it is not a particularly “exciting” trajectory, and the reward from having the new technology
implemented is lower. Instead, the radical trajectory is riskier, imposes larger adaptation costs upon the PU, but implies a
higher potential reward for the RU. Assumption 2 and Lemma 2 imply that the RU is guaranteed a positive expected payoff if
it chooses the incremental trajectory in equilibrium, i.e. UR =B− FI >0. This is more than plausible as the resistance exerted
by the PU is low. In the limit for FI =0, Assumption 2 is always satisfied.
Finally, to make the problem interesting, we assume that if the PU observes the choice of the trajectory and can react to it,
the RU chooses the incremental trajectory rather than the radical one to avoid a costly internal contest with the PU. The cost
of internal competition is thus sufficiently high to potentially influence the choice of the research trajectory. From Lemmata
2 and 3 it follows that this is the case if the following condition holds:
Assumption 3.
B − FI > Max
{
0, p
(
B − FR

)}
.
Below we shall investigate whether the firm can improve its expected profits by isolating the RU and creating a skunk
works model of innovation. The crucial difference between having the RU integrated in the firm and the skunk works model
is the amount of information that the PU receives about the RU’s actions. In particular, we assume that the PU observes the
choice of research trajectory if the RU is integrated in the firm but not if it is isolated. From a game theoretic point of view,
the difference between an integrated innovation model and a skunk works model boils down to the timing of the game. In
the integrated model, analyzed so far, the research trajectory is chosen (and observed) before defensive and creative efforts
13 The Aurora project set up by Teradyne in the mid-1990s is exemplar of this situation. Teradyne was the market leader (with about 22% of the world
market) in automatic test equipment used in the production of semiconductors. Teradyne employed a technology based onUNIX operating system software,
and was trying to shift to the CMOS technology based on Windows NT. In order to overcome the very high organizational resistance to this change, the
company decided to create an independent unit, called the Aurora project, that had the autonomy and resources to work on the new technology (Bower,
2005).
282 A. Fosfuri, T. Rønde / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 72 (2009) 274–289
are exerted. In the skunk works model the choices of research trajectory and efforts are all simultaneous.14 For simplicity,
we focus on pure strategies in the choice of the research trajectory.
The timing of the game is as follows. At t =1 the MU decides how to organize innovation activity by choosing between
an integrated model and the skunk works model. At t =2 the RU chooses which research trajectory to focus on, radical or
incremental. At t =3 the twodepartments simultaneouslyexert effort. Then, in caseof the radical trajectory, naturedetermines
whether the new technology is a success or a failure. At t =4 the MU observes the outcome of the innovation process and
decides whether to adopt the new technology. Finally, at t =5 all payoffs are realized.
4.2. The equilibrium analysis
The first step of the analysis is to determine the conditions under which the MU prefers that the RU pursues the radical
trajectory.
Lemma 5. The radical trajectory results in higher profits for the firm than the incremental trajectory if (and only if) the following
condition holds:
˘R = Min
{
BR
FR
p(3FR + pBR)
6
,
pFR
BR
FR(3 − 2p) + 3pBR
6
}
> ˘I =
FI
BI
FI + 3BI
6
where ˘ j is the profit when trajectory j is chosen, j= I, R.
Two conditions must be fulfilled for the radical trajectory to be more profitable than the incremental one. First, the stakes
of the PU and RU must be greater for the radical than for the incremental trajectory, which requires sufficiently high values of
p, FR, and  . High stakes translate into high expected efforts and profits (Lemmata 2 and 3). Second, the competition between
the two departments if the radical trajectory is chosen must be sufficiently balanced relative to the incremental trajectory
(Proposition 1). We shall look at a numerical example below that illustrates these conditions.
There is no doubt that isolating researchers in a skunk works can have strong motivational effects. The researchers might
identify themselveswith the project and feel obliged to deliver a radical, breakthrough innovation; perhaps even to the extent
of disregarding their own interests. The effect of such a perceived obligation can be captured in the model by assuming that
the skunk works model of innovation implies the RU’s commitment to the radical trajectory. Thus, given Assumption 3, the
MU implements the skunk works model to change the RU’s choice of trajectory if the condition in Lemma 5 is fulfilled.15
Let us turn to the other extreme case where the skunk works model has no commitment effects. The RU behaves here
strategically and chooses the trajectory that maximizes its payoff given the equilibrium behaviour of the PU. The next
proposition summarizes the equilibrium outcome for this case.
Proposition 3. Assume that p >1, i.e. the expected reward to the RU is larger in case of a radical trajectory, and that the RU
chooses the payoff maximizing trajectory given the equilibrium behaviour of the PU. Then, (i) the RU chooses the radical trajectory
under the skunk works model of innovation and the incremental trajectory under the integrated model of innovation, and (ii) the
MU implements the skunk works model of innovation if (and only if) the condition in Lemma 5, ˘R >˘ I, is fulfilled.
Proposition 3 shows that by implementing a skunk works model the firm can make the radical trajectory the equilibrium
outcome of the game when this trajectory is sufficiently attractive for the RU. By contrast, Assumption 2 implies that this is
never the equilibrium outcome under the integrated innovation model. The intuition behind this finding is the following: in
the integrated innovation model, the PU observes the choice of the trajectory. The radical trajectory is therefore unattractive
for the RU, because it results in strong defensive effort from the PU. In the skunk works model, on the other hand, the PU
does not observe the trajectory chosen. Hence, if the radical trajectory is sufficiently attractive for the RU, the choice of the
incremental trajectory cannot be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. The RU would deviate to the radical trajectory in such
an equilibrium because it could do so without triggering additional defensive effort by the non-suspecting PU. We show in
the proof of Proposition 3 that the skunk works model instead results in an equilibrium where the RU chooses the radical
trajectory. Of course, this is expected by the PU, and the two departments exert therefore high effort in equilibrium.
Loosely speaking, in the integrated model the PU and RU can “collude” on the incremental trajectory, an outcome they
both prefer vis-à-vis an equilibrium where the radical trajectory is chosen, because the PU punishes a deviation to the radical
trajectory by exerting a high amount of defensive effort. Instead, in the skunkworksmodel of innovation the collusion cannot
be sustained, because the PU does not observe such a deviation.
Fig. 1 illustrates the equilibrium choice of the innovationmodel for a numerical example. The two ˘ I =˘R-curves identify
the loci for which the MU is indifferent between the incremental and the radical trajectory. The north-east area of the two
curves corresponds to the parameter constellation for which the radical trajectory generates more expected profits. Here,
as discussed above, the stakes are high for the two units if the radical trajectory is chosen (high values of FR and ) and
the competition is relatively balanced (close to the FR =B-line). If the implementation of the skunk works model implies
14 The research trajectory is chosen before the creative effort, but these two choices are observed simultaneously by the PU.
15 If the MU has to compensate the RU for accepting to move to the skunk works facility, this must be subtracted from the expected profits of the radical
trajectory, ˘R, in Lemma 5.
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Fig. 1. The equilibrium choice of the innovation model in a specific example (B=0.5, p=0.5, FI =0.4,  =1.2). Assumption 3 is satisfied above the line with
this legend. When the radical trajectory is chosen the PU dominates above the FR =B-line and the RU dominates below. The skunk works model changes
the equilibrium outcome from the incremental to the radical trajectory to the right of the line  =1/p. The radical trajectory results in higher profits than
the incremental trajectory north-east of the two ˘R =˘ I − curves.
commitment to the radical trajectory, then the MU chooses the skunk work model in this area. When the skunks works
model has no commitment effects, the interesting part of the figure is to the right of the  =1/p-line where the skunk works
model induces the RU to switch to the radical trajectory. In this region the MU implements the skunk works model for values
of FR and  such that ˘R >˘ I (Proposition 3). As expected, the lack of commitment to the radical trajectory reduces the
parameter space under which the skunk works model of innovation is chosen by the MU.
Summarizing, our analysis implies that the firm can benefit from a skunk works model when resistance to change in case
of a radical innovation is particularly strong, and would induce researchers to follow more incremental research trajectories
under the integrated model. As also suggested by the examples mentioned above, the skunk works model of innovation
is likely to be employed by large bureaucratic corporations or established market leaders within a given technological
paradigm, which show very high adaptation costs in case of radical innovations (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson,
1993; Ghemawat, 1991). The other central insight is that the skunk works model is more likely to be successful when it
involves a project that the researchers find more interesting than projects involving the current technology.
Of course, the skunk works model can have several costs that we have ignored in the present formulation for the sake of
simplicity. For instance, the skunk works model can increase managing costs, can reduce collaboration between the PU and
the RU, or can simply have important set up costs. In addition, several difficulties might arise when the innovation developed
at the skunk works facility is integrated back into the parent organization. All these elements should be taken into account
and would reduce its profitability.
5. Monetary incentives
In this sectionwegeneralize theprevious analysis by introducingmonetary incentives andparticipation constraints for the
PU and the RU. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the RU faces monetary incentives only, whereas the PU is motivated
by a combination of monetary incentives and the cost of change, F. The use of monetary incentive schemes provides the MU
with better tools to shape the incentives inside the organization. At the same time, the participation constraints force the
MU to partly internalize the costs that internal competition imposes on the PU and the RU.
5.1. Integrated model with monetary incentives
We follow an incomplete contract approach by assuming that the characteristics of a technology can be observed ex post,
in particular its value, but cannot be included in a contract ex ante.16 If contracts can be made contingent on the value of the
technology, since there is a one-to-one relationship between efforts and values in our model, then the MU would be able
to implement any desired effort level without leaving rents to the PU and the RU. Thus, in a world of perfect contracting
possibilities the importanceof generating incentives through interdepartmental competitiondisappears.Details are available
from the authors upon request.
16 In recent years, there has been a heated debate in economics concerning the foundations for this type of contractual incompleteness (e.g., Maskin and
Tirole, 1999; Hart and Moore, 1999; Segal, 1999). We would like to note that the assumption that the values of the technologies are perfectly observed ex
post is stronger than needed. We have explored an alternative setup where the MU only observes which technology is the most valuable one, but it does not
observe the absolute values. This assumption captures the idea that one of the advantages of a contest is that it requires only ordinal comparisons among
alternatives. Adopting this alternative assumption comes at a cost in terms of the complexity of the analysis but does not change our results qualitatively.
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We assume below that it is either impossible or prohibitively expensive for outsiders to measure the value generated by
the technology. This is, e.g., likely to be the case in large diversified firms with many different sources of revenue where it is
difficult to verify the exact project cash flow in court. Thus, contracts based on the value of the technology are not feasible.
Alternatively, the MU could contract on certain characteristics of the technology such as design and functionality, but we
assume that it does not possess the necessary technical expertise to procure technologies in this way. We follow Rotemberg
andSaloner (1995,2000) inassuming that theonly informationavailable tocontractupon iswhether the technologyproposed
by the RU is implemented or not. This can either be thought of as an explicit contract upheld in court or as an implicit contract
maintained through reputational concerns.
5.1.1. The setup
At the beginning of the game the MU offers a contract to each of the two departments. The contract to the RU consists of a
bonus B if the new technology is implemented, CRU =B. The contract to the PU consists of a bonus W if the current technology
is maintained. The net utility resulting from the bonus is not always sufficient to compensate the PU for the cost of change.
For this reason, the contract to the PU might also include a fixed wage W˜ to ensure its participation, CPU = (W,W˜).
The PU and the RU observe the offers made and calculate the expected payoff from accepting the contract. They accept
the contract if and only if the expected payoff is greater than the outside option. If the contracts are accepted, the RU and the
PU simultaneously exert efforts. After uncertainty is resolved, the MU chooses the most profitable technology. At the end of
the game, wages are paid and profits are realized.
5.1.2. The optimal contracts
We solve the game backwards and look first at the MU’s choice between the two technologies. Unlike the basic model,
the MU takes the bonuses into account because they represent a cost of using the technology in question. The MU chooses
the new technology developed by the RU if and only if P −W≤R −B⇔ eP −W<eR −B. Hence, the PU dominates the RU
in the contest of technologies if and only if p(F+W)−W≥pB−B.
From the analysis of the basicmodel, it should be clear that theMUwould never offer bonuses such that the RU dominates
the internal competition. If so, the MU could reduce B by some small amount, which would both reduce the expected wage
bill and increase the expected efforts due to tougher internal competition. We can thus restrict attention to contracts such
that the PU weakly dominates the competition.
The following lemma summarizes the analysis of the competition between the PU and the RU.
Lemma 6. Suppose that the PU and the RU have accepted the proposed contracts. Let pF− (1−p)W≥ (p −1)B, such that the
PU dominates the internal competition. The expected payoffs of the PU, the RU, and the firm are, respectively: UP = W˜ − ( − 1)B,
UR =0, and
˘(B,W, W˜) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(B − W)2(2B + 3F + W) − 3Bp(B2 + 2BF + W2) + 3(Bp)2(F + W) + (Bp)3
6Bp(F + W) − W˜ if B > F
B((3p − 6)(F + W) + Bp22)
6Bp(F + W) − W˜ otherwise.
At the first stage of the game, the MU decides which contracts to offer. The MU does not have to worry about the RU
rejecting the contract, as the RU can secure itself a payoff of zero by choosing eR =0. The PU can avoid the cost of effort by
choosing eP =0 but not the cost of change. Hence, the contractsCPU andCRU have to satisfy a voluntary participation constraint
(VPCPU) that ensures to the PU an expected payoff greater than or equal to the outside option.
Using the results of Lemma 5, the optimal contracts solve the following program:
Max(B,W,W˜)˘(B,W, W˜) (Program of the MU)
s.t. W˜ − (p − 1)B ≥ −K (VCPPU)
The next proposition characterizes the solution to this program.
Proposition 5. Suppose that it is possible to contract upon the implementation of the new technology. Then, the optimal contract
to the PUneither includes a fixedwagenor a bonus if the current technology ismaintained:CPU = (W,W˜) = (0,0). The optimal con-
tract to the RU is as follows: (i) If pF≤K, the optimal contract is chosen such that the competition is balanced: CRU =B=pF/(p −1).
(ii) If pF>K, the optimal bonus is chosen such that the participation constraint of the PU binds: CRU =B=K/(p −1).
Proposition 5 confirms the principle of balanced competition but with some qualifications. Part (i) shows that if the
participation constraint of the PU does not bind, either because the cost of change is low or the outside option is unattractive,
the MU will offer contracts that balance the internal competition. However, the MU only offers a monetary bonus to the RU
and relies on the non-monetary cost of change F to motivate the PU. The reason is that the PU’s effort comes at a higher
cost than the value it creates to the firm. Offering a monetary bonus to both departments in order to obtain higher efforts is
therefore not profitable. Part (ii) of Proposition 5 concerns the casewhere a fully balanced conflictwould require a fixedwage
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to the PU to ensure that CPU is accepted.17 Here, the MU uses B to balance the conflict, but only up to the point where the
voluntary participation constraint of the PU binds. Increasing B beyond this threshold would make the RU stronger, balance
the conflict further, and result in higher efforts. However, the extra cost in terms of higher wages outweighs the expected
benefit, and the MU prefers to maintain the competition unbalanced.
We have also performed different robustness checks. As the logic of the arguments is similar, we have preferred to leave
out the formal analysis. Details are available from the authors upon request. First, if the defensive effort were sufficiently
productive, it would be optimal to offer a monetary bonus to the PU as well. In this case, the optimal contracts balance
the internal competition, include a monetary bonus to both departments, and induce one of the departments to exert the
maximal possible effort. Second, rather than rewarding the PU for keeping the current technology, the MU could pay a bonus
to the PU as a compensation for the change in the technology.18 Such a bonus would decrease the PU’s strength, thereby
balancing the competition and increasing efforts. However, if the participation constraint of the PUdoes not bind, the optimal
way to balance the competition is by increasing the RU’s reward for winning rather than compensating the PU for losing. The
reason is that stakes of the twodepartments in the competition are greater,which results in higher efforts. If the participation
constraint of the PU binds in the solution, things can be different. Compensating the PU for the change in the technology
achieves here two things: it makes the conflict more balanced, and it relaxes the participation constraint of the PU. The latter
effect makes it possible for the MU to balance the competition further by increasing B (the reward to the RU) without having
to increase the PU’s fixed wage as well. Still, as the expected wage bill increases, it depends on the specific values of the
parameters whether compensating the PU for change is profitable or not.19
5.2. Skunk works model with monetary incentives
A thorough analysis of the skunkworksmodelwithmonetary incentiveswould require some lengthy and tedious algebra.
We thus only discuss informally how the insights developed in Section 4 would change in this setting. For simplicity, we
assume that K≥pF, which implies that the PU will never use the option to leave the firm.
First, notice that if the skunk works model comes with the commitment to work on a radical trajectory, then the analysis
in Section 5.1 applies mutatis mutandis. The only difference is that the MU compares the profitability of the two trajectories
when bonuses are chosen optimally. Second, if there is no commitment, then one needs to distinguish between whether
the monetary reward can or cannot be made contingent upon the trajectory chosen (radical vs. incremental). In the case
of contingent rewards, the MU can steer the RU onto the radical trajectory by fixing the reward in case of an incremental
trajectory equal to 0, and make the RU slightly dominate the competition in case of a radical trajectory.20 The cost of doing
this is very small, as the bonus paid to the RU only needs to be an epsilon greater than the optimal bonus that balances the
competition (Proposition 5). Thus, the role of the skunk works model disappears.
When the rewards cannot be made contingent upon the trajectory chosen – which we believe is the most plausible
situation – the MU cannot use monetary incentives to induce the choice of the radical trajectory. The reason is that the
reward is the same on the two trajectories, but the radical trajectory has a lower success probability. Hence, the RU chooses
the incremental trajectory for any positive bonus, both in the integrated model and in the skunk works model. Thus, a
necessary condition for the skunk works model to work is the presence of non-monetary incentives (personal satisfaction,
career concerns, internal recognition and status, taste for research, etc.), which, other things being equal, make the RU’s
reward larger on the radical trajectory than on the incremental trajectory. If this is the case, then the analysis of Section 4
applies almost unchanged. The only difference is that now the MU can use a monetary reward to make the competition more
balanced and thus increase its expected profits.
Summarizing, with monetary incentives the skunk works model of innovation is still a useful solution to achieve a radical
trajectory when: (a) it entails commitment; or (b) monetary incentives cannot be made contingent upon the trajectory
chosen and the researchers have a strong intrinsic motivation to work on the radical trajectory.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Whenafirm innovates, its organization, or parts of it, needs toundergo somechanges to adapt to thenewcourse of actions.
This process is likely to entail costs, and often the introduction of an innovation faces some internal resistance. In this paper
we have analyzed the case of a large corporation in which an innovation imposes re-adjustment costs upon a production
department that, in response to this threat, tries to resist change by making the current technology more valuable to the
firm. This situation is modelled as an internal competition between an R&D department that investigates and proposes new
solutions, and a production department that defends the status-quo. We have shown that stronger resistance to change due
17 Notice that the payoff of the PU is decreasing in the strength of the RU.
18 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us this possibility.
19 It can be optimal for the MU to compensate the PU when the PU is strong (high F), the RU is weak (low ), and the outside option of the PU is good (low
K).
20 We only focus on the interesting case in which the firm prefers the radical trajectory but the RU chooses the incremental trajectory to avoid costly
competition from the PU.
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to larger re-adjustment costs is not necessarily a problem for a firm. To the contrary, firms with a capable R&D department
can leverage such resistance to change to foster more valuable innovations as well as larger improvements of the existing
technology.
A key insight fromour analysis iswhatwe have labelled as the “principle of balanced competition”. In fact, we have shown
that, other things equal, firms that successfully maintain a balance between the two departments outperform firms where
one department largely dominates the other. Balanced internal competition stimulates efforts both from the production
department to improve and perfect the actual technology and from the R&D department to investigate and propose even
better solutions.
While the general principle is simple, its proper application requires detailed knowledge of the firm and its environment.
Wehaveshownthat the strengthof thedepartmentsdependsonmanydifferent factors suchas thecostof change, the intrinsic
motivation of the researchers, the potential of the new technology, the degree of overlap between the departments, etc. It is
the combination of these variables that determines the degree of internal competition. This complexity notwithstanding, the
principle still provides useful guidance to practitioners. It suggests, for example, that firms that face very strong resistance
to change should hire more able researchers, or increase the budget of their R&D department, to leverage the internal
competition further.21 This emphasizes the point made above that strong inertial forces are not necessarily a disadvantage
for a firm, but can – if properly managed – spur both innovation and performance. Similarly, firms that have a well-trained
and flexible production department that embraces rather than resists change should be careful not to strengthen the R&D
department too much, e.g., by offering high-powered monetary incentive schemes.
Theprinciple of balanced competition is similar in spirit to the recommendation by organization scholars that the success-
ful firm should pursue a balance between exploration of new alternatives and exploitation of current capabilities (Levinthal
and March, 1993; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). In our model, while the production department is devoted to improve and
perfect the actual technology, the R&D department is in charged with identifying and exploring new opportunities. We con-
tribute to this literature by offering a different, incentive-based view of the tension between exploitative and explorative
activities. The traditional argument is that by investing too much in one activity the firm develops routines and accumulates
learning that are idiosyncratic to this activity, and that reduces its ability to perform the other activity. We offer here a com-
plementary reason for keeping a balance between these activities: they compete for scarce resources, and such competition
generates the highest payoff when it is equally grounded.
Our model deliberately emphasizes the benefits of internal competition and thus the importance of managing such
competition in the most efficient way. However, we do not deny that competition between the departments might give rise
to costs as well. These costs can take the form of lack of collaboration, failure to establish a corporate culture, influence
activities, etc. In the second part of the paper, we address this issue by looking at the potential distortion that the threat of
internal competition might generate in the choice of the research trajectory. The problem arises when the R&D department
chooses an incremental trajectory instead of a more profitable radical trajectory to avoid a costly competition with the
production department. We show that the firm can restore the incentives to choose a radical trajectory by implementing
the so-called “skunk works model” of innovation, which consists of isolating the R&D department from the rest of the firm.
This provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first formal analysis of the skunk works model; an innovation model that
has been widely discussed in the business press and extensively applied by firms like IBM, Siemens, Philips and Intel, among
others.
Stretching a bit the boundaries of our model, one could argue that re-adjustment costs in the case of radical innovations
are especially important for large established firms. Thus, our paper fits well within the organization literature that has
analyzed extensively the problems that large established incumbents have in developing and adopting radical innovations
that require completely new sets of routines and capabilities (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson, 1993; Ghemawat,
1991). We contribute to this literature by emphasizing that even if established firms might be endowed with the routines
and capabilities to copewith radical innovations, the threat of costly internal competitionmight prevent the R&Ddepartment
from exploring more radical research trajectories.
Isolating the researchers in a skunk works might in itself make them try to develop a radical innovation. However, if
this is not the case, two important considerations for managers have emerged from our analysis of the skunk works model.
First, the key element of the skunk works model is that the information flows between the R&D department and the rest of
the organization are eliminated. This finding implies that secrecy and autonomy are very important for this organizational
solution to function properly. If it is possible to infer the type of project on which the R&D department is working, e.g., from
financial accounts or internal memos, our analysis suggests that the advantage of the skunk works model of innovation is
lost. Second, our paper shows that in order to induce the R&D department to choose the radical trajectory, the expected
reward should include a sufficiently large non-monetary component. This implies that researchers who are part of a skunk
works model must have a taste for radical innovations; that is, they should enjoy working in an experimental, risky, and
exciting environment where major breakthroughs could emerge, but where lots of uncertainties are still unsolved. Thus, the
selection of the researchers who should belong to the skunk works model is a critical task for the management of the firm
and its human resources department.
21 This result is of a similar flavor to early work by Lazear and Rosen (1981) who suggested that workers in a promotion contest should be matched in
groups of similar ability.
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As a final consideration, our approach has stressed the importance of generating incentives through internal competi-
tion when contracting possibilities are either limited or too costly. The complexities and uncertainties of the innovation
process make an incomplete contract approach quite reasonable within our context. However, we believe that, except in
cases where contracting possibilities are extremely good, the insights of our analysis are still valid and relevant when more
contractual solutions are available. The role of monetary rewards is then to top up non-monetary incentives and to balance
the competition between the departments.
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Appendix A. Proofs of lemmata and propositions
Proof of Lemma 2. The maximal amount that the RU and the PU would be willing to invest into the contest are pB and
pF, respectively. Following the argument outlined in the proof of Lemma 1, it can be shown that there does not exist an
equilibrium in mixed strategies where the two units randomize among a finite number of effort levels. Consider instead
an equilibrium where the two units randomize among an infinite number of effort levels. In particular, the PU randomizes
among all eP ∈ [0,pF] according to the distribution function G(·), and the RU randomizes among all eR ∈ [0,pF/] according to
the distribution function H(·). Assuming that the RU does not put probability mass on any effort level, which is satisfied in
equilibrium, the expected utility of the PU can be written as
UP = p
(
1 − H
(
eP

))
(w − eP − F) +
(
1 − p
(
1 − H
(
eP

)))
(w − eP) ⇔ H(eR) =
UP − w + pF
pF
+ eR
pF
.
Turning to the RU, we have:
UR = pG(eR)(B − eR) + (1 − pG(eR))(−eR) ⇔ G(eP) =
UR
pB
+ eP
pB
.
Using G(pF) = 1 and H(pF/) = 1, it follows that:
H(eR)=
eR
pF
for all eR ∈
[
0,
pF

]
and UP = w − pF, G(eP) = 1 −
F
B
+ eP
pB
for all eP ∈ [0, pF] and UR = p
(
B − F

)
.
Finally, the expected profits of the firm can be written as
E˘ =
∫ pF/
0
{G(eR)[(peR + (1 − p)E(eP |eP < eR)] + (1 − G(eR))E(eP |eP > eR)}h(eR)deR,
where E(eP |eP > eR) = (pF + eR/2), E(eP |eP < eR) = (1/G(eR))
∫ eR
0
eP/pBdep, and h(eR) =/pF. Simplifying the expres-
sion, we obtain the expected profits reported in the lemma.
Proof of Remark 1. The expected efforts are obtained using the distribution functions reported in Lemmata 2 and 3 and
integrating over the relevant intervals. 
Proof of Remark 2. The comparative statics follow directly from differentiating the profit expressions in Lemmata 2 and 3
and from the expected efforts reported in Remark 1.
Equilibrium Strategies and Proof of Lemma 4. When the PU dominates (F+0(˛) >B), the PU randomizes according
to G(eP) = (0(˛) + eP)/B for all eP ∈ [0,B−0(˛). The RU randomizes among eR ∈ {0} ∪ [(0(˛)/), B] according to H(eR)
where H(eR) = 1 − (B/F) + (0(˛)/) for all eR ∈ [0,0(˛)/) and H(eR) = 1 − (B/F) + (eR/F) for all eR ∈ [(0(˛)/), B].
When the RU dominates (F+0(˛) <B), the PU randomizes according to G(eP) = 1 − (F/B) + (eP/B) for all eP ∈ [0,F]
and the RU randomizes according to H(eR) = (eR/F) − (0(˛)/F) for all eR ∈ [0(˛)/, (0(˛) + F)/]. The expected
profits are calculated using the equilibrium strategies reported above. The sign of ∂1(˛)/∂˛ follows directly from
∂1(˛)/∂˛= [∂1(˛)/∂0(˛)][∂0(˛)/∂˛] where ∂0(˛)/∂˛>0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. A myopic firm chooses  to solve ∂0(˛)/∂˛−∂C(˛)/∂˛=0 whereas a forwarding-looking firm
solves ∂0(˛)/∂˛+∂1(˛)/∂˛−∂C(˛)/∂˛=0. The proof follows then from the concavity of the profit function in ˛ and the
sign of ∂1(˛)/∂˛ as reported in Lemma 4. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider first part (i). Notice that Assumption 3 implies that the RU chooses the incremental
trajectory under the integrated model of innovation. Consider now the skunk works model. Here, there cannot exist an
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equilibrium where the RU chooses the incremental trajectory. In such an equilibrium, the PU randomizes according to
G(eP) = 1 − (FI/B) + (eP/B) for all eP ∈ [0,FI] and UR =G(eR)B− eR. The RU has an incentive to deviate to the radical trajectory
that results in an expected utility of pG(eR)B− eR, which is strictly greater than G(eR)B− eR for any given eR since  >1
(Assumption 1) and p >1.
Consider instead an equilibrium where the RU chooses the radical trajectory. From Lemma 3 we know that
when FR >B the PU randomizes in equilibrium according to G(eP) = (eP/pB) for all eP ∈ [0,pB] and UR =0.
Suppose that the RU would deviate to the incremental trajectory. This would produce an expected utility
equal to:
G(eR)(B − eR) + (1 − G(eR))(−eR) = eR
(
1
p
− 1
)
,
which is non-positive since  >1 and p >1. Therefore, the RU has no incentive to deviate. Similarly, when FR <B the PU
randomizes according to G(eP) = 1 − (FR/B) + (eP/pB) for all eP ∈ [0,pFR] and UR = p(B − (FR/)). Suppose that the RU
would deviate to the incremental trajectory. This would produce an expected utility equal to B − (FR/) + (eR/p) − eR.
Since p >1, the optimal effort when deviating to the incremental trajectory would therefore be eR =0. This would result in
an expected utility of B− FR/ . It is easy to see that such deviation is not profitable when p >1. Hence, for p >1 only the
radical trajectory can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome of the game.
Consider now part (ii). Given the result of part (i), the MU chooses the skunk works model if and only if the radical
trajectory results in higher profits than the incremental trajectory. The result follows.
Proofof Lemma5. The Lemma followsdirectly fromtheprofit functions in Lemmata2and3, noticing that theRUdominates
when the incremental trajectory is chosen fromAssumption 2whereas either the RUor the PU candominatewhen the radical
trajectory is chosen.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose that the PU dominates and that B>W. Then, the PU randomizes according to G(eP) = (B − W +
eP)/pB for all eP ∈ [0,(p−1)B+W] and the RU randomizes according to H(eR) = 1 − (B/(F + W)) + (eR/(p(F + W))) for all
eR ∈ {0}∪ [(B−W)/ ,pB].
Suppose instead that the PU dominates but that B≤W. Then, the PU randomizes according to G(eP) = ((B − W) + eP)/pB
for all eP ∈ [W−B,(p−1)B+W] and the RU randomizes according to H(eR) = 1 − (B/(F + W)) + (eR/(p(F + W))) for all
eR ∈ [0,pB].
The expected profits are calculated as in the proof of Lemma 2, the only difference being that the bonuses are monetary
and therefore represent a cost for the firm. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We consider two cases, K≥pF and K<pF.
Case I: K≥pF.
The PU can always ensure a payoff of −pF by choosing eP =0. Hence, the participation constraint does not bind and W˜ = 0.
The optimal bonuses are such that B≥W since ∂˘(B,W,0)/∂W≤0 for W>B. Hence, B∈ [W,(p(F+W)−W)/p −1] where the
upper bound on B guarantees that the PU dominates. Notice that this implies that W∈ [0,F/( −1).
Since ∂2˘(B,W,0)/∂B2 > 0, there are two sets of solutions depending on whether B=W or B= (p(F+W)−W)/(p −1).
Consider first the candidate solutions for which B=W. Since ∂2˘(W,W,0)/∂W2 > 0, the candidate solutions are B=W=0 and
B=W= F/( −1).
Consider instead the candidate solutions for which B= (p(F+W)−W)/(p −1). Here, ∂2˘((p(F+W)−W)/
(p −1),W,0)/∂W2 > 0. This results in an additional candidate solution, B=pF/(p −1) and W=0 plus the previous
candidate solution B=W= F/( −1).
Finally, comparing the profits of the three candidate solutions, the result reported in the proposition is obtained.
Case II: K<pF.
From (Program of the MU) follows that there are two cases to consider. The (VPCPU) binds for B>K/(p −1) whereas it
does not bind for B≤K/(p −1). Only the proof for the case K/(p −1) < F/( −1) is included, but the proof for the other case
is similar. Details are available upon request.
As in Case I, it has to hold that B∈ [W,(p(F+W)−W)/(p −1)] and W∈ [0,F/( −1)]. Furthermore, because
∂2˘(B,W,0)/∂B2 >0 both for B>K/(p −1) and B≤K/(p −1), the optimal bonus B is a corner solution.
Consider first B∈ [W, K/(p −1)] where W˜ = 0. There are two sets of solutions depending on B=W or B = K/(p − 1) (as
K/(p − 1) < (p(F + W) − W)/(p − 1) in the case considered). Similar to Case I, the candidate solutions for B=W are: (i)
B=W=0 and (ii)B=W=K/(p −1). ForB=K/(p −1), it canbe shown that ∂˘((K/p − 1),W,0)/∂B < 0.Hence, the candidate
solution is: (iii) B = K/(p − 1) and W=0. Comparing the three candidate solutions, (∂˘((K/(p − 1)),W,0))/∂B < 0 implies
that candidate solution (iii) dominates candidate solution (ii). Furthermore, candidate solution (iii) dominates candidate
solution (i), because ˘(0,0,0) < ˘(K/(p − 1),0,0). Hence, the optimal bonuses for B∈ [W,K/(p −1)] are B=K/(p −1)
and W=0.
Consider instead B∈ [K/(p −1),(p,(F+W)−W)(p −1)] where W˜ = B(p − 1) − K . For B=K/(p −1), the relevant
candidate solution is again: (i) B=K/(p −1) and W=0. For B = (p(F + W) − W)/(p − 1), (∂2˘((p(F+W)−W))/
(p −1),W,0)/∂W2 > 0 implies that the candidate solutions are: (ii) B=W= F/( −1) >K/(p −1) and (iii) B = pF/(p − 1) and
W=0. Here, as ˘(K/(p − 1),0,0) > ˘(K/(p − 1), K/(p − 1),0) > ˘(F/( − 1), F/( − 1), F(p − 1)/( − 1) − K), candi-
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date solution (i) dominates candidate solution (ii). Furthermore, as ∂˘(B,0,B(p−1)−K)/∂B<0 for B>K/(p −1), candidate
solution (i) dominates candidate solution (iii).
Summarizing the two cases, the optimal bonuses are B=pF/(p −1) and W=0 for K<pF. 
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